Old Dominion University

ODU Digital Commons
Information Technology & Decision Sciences
Faculty Publications

Information Technology & Decision Sciences

2016

Supporting Business Privacy Protection in Wireless
Sensor Networks
Nan Feng
Zhiqi Hao
Sibo Yang
Harris Wu
Old Dominion University, hwu@odu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/itds_facpubs
Part of the Business and Corporate Communications Commons, and the Electrical and
Electronics Commons
Repository Citation
Feng, Nan; Hao, Zhiqi; Yang, Sibo; and Wu, Harris, "Supporting Business Privacy Protection in Wireless Sensor Networks" (2016).
Information Technology & Decision Sciences Faculty Publications. 15.
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/itds_facpubs/15

Original Publication Citation
Feng, N., Hao, Z. Q., Yang, S. B., & Wu, H. (2016). Supporting business privacy protection in wireless sensor networks. Journal of
Sensors, 2016, 7638149. doi:10.1155/2016/7638149

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Information Technology & Decision Sciences at ODU Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Information Technology & Decision Sciences Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons.
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.

Hindawi Publishing Corporation
Journal of Sensors
Volume 2016, Article ID 7638149, 11 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/7638149

Hindawi

Research Article
Supporting Business Privacy Protection in Wireless
Sensor Networks
Nan Feng,1 Zhiqi Hao,1 Sibo Yang,1 and Harris Wu2
1

Department of Information Management, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA 23529, USA

2

Correspondence should be addressed to Sibo Yang; yangsibo@tju.edu.cn
Received 15 March 2016; Revised 19 May 2016; Accepted 21 June 2016
Academic Editor: Jose M. De Fuentes
Copyright © 2016 Nan Feng et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
With the pervasive use of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) within commercial environments, business privacy leakage due to the
exposure of sensitive information transmitted in a WSN has become a major issue for enterprises. We examine business privacy
protection in the application of WSNs. We propose a business privacy-protection system (BPS) that is modeled as a hierarchical
profile in order to filter sensitive information with respect to enterprise-specified privacy requirements. The BPS aims at solving a
tradeoff between metrics that are defined to estimate the utility of information and the business privacy risk. We design profile, risk
assessment, and filtration agents to implement the BPS based on multiagent technology. The effectiveness of our proposed BPS is
validated by experiments.

1. Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are highly distributed
networks that are enabled with wireless communication technologies and composed of devices with sensing capabilities
[1, 2]. The rapid development of WSNs is changing the
way people live and work. Extensive research has focused
on a broad range of applications of WSNs, including both
the military and civilian domains [3, 4]. However, it is
the issue of privacy protection that has drawn considerable
attention from the research community. This is because of the
implementation of WSNs in commercial scenarios involving
businesses and individuals.
Privacy protection has been studied in many fields
associated with the applications of WSNs. Nevertheless, the
following inherent characteristics lead to some challenges for
privacy protection in WSNs.
(i) Uncontrollable environment: sensors are commonly
employed in an environment without sufficient security control.
(ii) Resource constraints: the ability of a sensor node
to store, process, and transmit the sensed data is
generally limited by its power supply.

(iii) Topological constraints: due to the limited communication range of sensor nodes, multiple hops are
required for transmitting data. Such a transmission
scheme may cause an unbalanced network load.
In addition to the above challenges, employers must pay
much attention to the threat of business privacy leakage
due to the accessibility of WSNs [5, 6]. The attributes of
WSNs may lead to the disclosure of sensitive information
regarding the enterprise. This is susceptible to being collected
and analyzed by an adversary, who can in turn harm the
enterprise’s business privacy [7]. Thus, when an enterprise
employs a WSN for commercial transactions, the disclosure
of sensitive or confidential information will be inevitable
without effective business privacy protection.
Although business privacy protection is imperative in
the applications of WSNs, there has been minimal attention
devoted to the threat of business privacy leakage for enterprises. Existing studies focus mainly on how to protect the
individual’s privacy in the context of WSNs [8–11]. Therefore,
in this paper, we propose a business privacy-protection
system (BPS) that is designed specifically for enterprises in
order to reduce the threat of business privacy leakage in
WSNs. The BPS is implemented by three types of agent:
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a profile agent, a risk assessment agent, and a filtration agent,
all based on multiagent technology. Integrating the current
risk level of privacy leakage, the BPS makes a tradeoff between
the utility of information transmitted in a WSN and the risk
of privacy leakage and finally generates the optimal filtered
profile that satisfies the security requirements.
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as
follows. We first review the relevant literature. Then, Section 3
presents the components of our proposed BPS in detail.
In Section 4, the BPS is validated further by extensive
experiments. Finally, we summarize our contributions.

2. Literature Review
Privacy protection in WSNs can be categorized as dataoriented and context-oriented [12]. Data-oriented privacy
protection focuses on protecting the privacy of the data
sensed by the nodes [13] and the queries posted to the WSN
[14]. Context-oriented privacy protection focuses instead on
protecting the metadata related to the transmission of data,
such as the information of time and location. This paper aims
at solving the issues in data-oriented privacy protection.
To understand the challenges of privacy protection in
WSNs, it is necessary first to review the privacy issues and
privacy-protection approaches as follows.
Privacy concerns related to sensed-data management
have been proposed in several different systems [15]. (1) Datacollection system: the privacy-protection methods commonly employed in data-collection systems are randomperturbation techniques [16, 17]. (2) Information-sharing system: such systems commonly use cryptographic secure multiparty computation techniques [18, 19]. (3) Data-publishing
system: the system’s purpose is to facilitate data-analysis
applications. In these systems, algorithms based on 𝑘anonymity [20] and 𝑙-diversity [21] are widely used to protect
privacy. Privacy issues have also been investigated in privacyprotection schemes. In [22, 23], the researchers emphasized
that the sender’s location information is the most important
data that need to be protected. Some researchers have tried
to hide the origin of the message [24]. Mehta et al. [25]
first focused on the location privacy of sensor networks in
the global environment, the assumption which became the
basis for future research. In order to protect the location
privacy, some scholars proposed a new approach for network
topology discovery that allows the sink to obtain a global view
of the topology without revealing its own location [26]. Some
scholars addressed the importance of location privacy of both
the source and sink and proposed four schemes, respectively,
to deliver messages from source to sink, which can protect
the end-to-end location privacy against local eavesdropper
[27]. In order to resist the attacks targeted at the base station
of WSNs, some scholars present HISP-NC (Homogenous
Injection for Sink Privacy with Node Compromise Protection), a receiver-location privacy solution that consists of two
complementary schemes which protect the location of the
base station [10].
In recent years, multiagent technology has been widely
applied in the field of privacy protection. A multiagent
system (MAS) is a system consisting of several agents. Agents
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Table 1: Comparison between BPS and other approaches.

Risk level
evaluation
Information
filtration
Location
privacy
protection
Resisting
traffic
analysis
Tool support

BPS

DCARP

FRW

HISP-NC

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Hugin expert

NA

TOSSIM

MATLAB

coordinate among the various members, provide service for
one another, and together complete a task. The goal of a MAS
is to convert large and complex systems into small, wellcommunicated, well-coordinated, and easy-to-manage systems [28]. In a MAS, each agent is independent, autonomous,
and able to solve a given problem. Simultaneously, it is a
coordinated system in which agents solve large complex
problems in coordination with one another. As for the privacy
protection related to privacy leakage, some researchers have
focused on a secure model that shows how to maintain the
secrecy in a cloud environment by using a MAS. Yang et al.
[29] focused on developing an active defense for emergencymanagement system engineering using a MAS. Bishop et al.
[30] proposed a mobile agent-based approach to automate
the process of detecting and monitoring a colored file system
for privacy protection. In this paper, we utilize multiagent
technology to build our proposed BPS. There are three agents,
profile, risk assessment, and filtration agents, that interact
with each other for the common goal of privacy protection
in a WSN.
In this paper, we examine the business privacy protection
in a WSN. We model the sensed information as a hierarchical
profile. Furthermore, we utilize multiagent technology to
build our proposed BPS. There are three agents, profile,
risk assessment, and filtration agents, that interact with
each other for the common goal of privacy protection in
a WSN. In the filtration agent, a filtration is developed to
filter sensitive information from the profile with respect to
enterprise-specified privacy requirements. In addition, the
effectiveness and the scalability of the filtration are validated
by experiments.
Table 1 shows the comparison results between our proposed BPS and other widely used three approaches, namely,
DCARP [26], FRW [27], and HISP-NC [10], where NA means
information not found in the related references.
The first issue is the capability of risk level evaluation.
In WSN, the entire system faces many risks, and we need to
assess the risk and determine the risk level that the enterprise
is now facing. As a result, it can be determined which
appropriate measures need to be taken immediately to reduce
the risks. In BPS, based on BN, we can analyze the current
risk level of the enterprise. The second issue is about the
information filtration. Faced with the risk, enterprise must
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the consequences of intervention. Also, the BN is an ideal
representation for combining prior knowledge (which often
comes in causal form) and data because it has both causal and
probabilistic semantics. Based on these characteristics of BN,
it is suitable to predict the risk of privacy leakage.
In the BPS, there are three types of agents to be considered
for simulating the process of business privacy risk protection
in a WSN. These agents are described as follows:

Profile agent

Enterprise profile

[__r-------']
Risk assessment agent

(1) The profile agent is responsible for establishing the
enterprise profile 𝐸. It includes two phases: constructing profile and customizing privacy requirement.

I

Risk threshold

Filtration agent

Sensed
data

Sensor
nodes

Filtered profile
of sensed data

Figure 1: BPS architecture.

make adjustment to change the situation. In WSN, a lot of
data is related to enterprise’s sensitive information, so we
have to make filtration before it is published. In the BPS,
we have established a filtration agent which seeks a tradeoff
between risk and utility to carry out this work. The third issue
is the location privacy protection that refers to the sensors’
location information in WSN. It is vital because it is related
to the source and sink. In BPS, we consider this problem
in the enterprise profile as the case in chapter 5 described.
The fourth issue is about resisting traffic analysis. Both of
DCARP and HISP-NC are good at resisting traffic analysis.
We will do some work about it later to enrich our BPS. The
fifth issue is about tool support. Hugin expert is used in BPS
and TOSSIM is used in FRW, whereas MATLAB is used in
HISP-NC. Supporting tools for DCARP have not been found.

3. Business Privacy-Protection System
In this section, we propose a business privacy-protection
system (BPS) based on multiagent technology and discuss the
characteristics and functions for each of the agents. Figure 1
demonstrates the BPS architecture and shows the agents and
their interactions.
A Bayesian network (BN) is a directed acyclic graph
(DAG), composed of representatives of the variable nodes
and edges connecting these nodes. Nodes represent random
variables and directed edges represent the mutual relationship between the nodes (by the parent node to its child
nodes). The intensity of the relationship is expressed by the
conditional probability between nodes and the no parent
nodes express information with a priori probability. A BN can
be used to learn causal relationships and hence can be used to
gain understanding about a problem domain and to predict

(2) The risk assessment agent encapsulates a BN that is
employed to estimate the risk of privacy leakage. The
nodes of the BN are variables that describe the risk
environment for privacy leakage. The outcome of this
agent is used to determine the risk threshold.
(3) The filtration agent aims to work out all possible
filtered profiles to find the optimal filtration. The
process of the filtration is based on two conflicting
metrics named utility and risk. The outcome of this
agent is a filtered profile that has highest utility and
satisfies the business privacy requirement.
3.1. Profile Agent. The formal definition of enterprise profile
is presented as follows.
Definition 1 (enterprise profile). The enterprise profile 𝐸
is a hierarchical representation of the topic domain of an
enterprise.
The enterprise profile 𝐸 satisfies the assumption that,
given a topic 𝑡 related to the enterprise, a corresponding node
can be found in 𝐸, with the subtree (𝑡, 𝐸) as the taxonomy
accompanying 𝑡. Furthermore, for each topic 𝑡 ∈ 𝐸, a profile
support, denoted by sup𝐸 (𝑡), represents the frequency of the
topic 𝑡 mentioned in 𝐸. If the topic 𝑡 can be considered as
the result of a random walk from its parent topic Par(𝑡, 𝐸)
in 𝐸, the profile support can be recursively aggregated as the
following equation:
sup𝐸 (𝑡) =

∑ sup𝐸 (𝑡 ) ,

𝑡 ∈𝐶(𝑡,𝐸)

(1)

where 𝐶(𝑡, 𝐸) is the children of 𝑡 within the tree 𝐸.
The procedure of profile agent consists of the following
two steps:
(1) Constructing profile.
(2) Customizing privacy requirement.
(1) Constructing Profile. The original enterprise profile 𝐸 is
constructed in a form of topic hierarchy as follows:
(1) Build the enterprise profile as a topic path trie with
the topic set 𝑇; that is, 𝐸 = trie(𝑇).
(2) For topic 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, initialize the profile support sup𝐸 (𝑡)
with (1).
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Input: Set of all/candidate edges
Output: Bayesian network
//Initialization
(1) define m as the number of ants;
(2) pheromones 𝜏: initialize each entry of 𝜏 with 𝜏0 ;
(3) define 𝑁max as max number of iterations;
(4) 𝑁iter = 0;
(5) 𝐺∗ = empty graph;
//Optimization
(6) repeat
(7)
for 𝑘 = 1 to 𝑚 do
(8)
for 𝑖 = 1 to 𝑛 do 𝑃𝑎(𝑥𝑖 ) = 𝜙;
(9)
for 𝑖 = 1 and 𝑗 = 1 to 𝑛 do
(10)
if (𝑖 ≠ 𝑗) then 𝜂𝑖𝑗 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 ) − 𝑓(𝑥𝑖 , 𝜙);
(11)
end
(12)
repeat
(13)
Select two indexes 𝑖 and 𝑗 by using (5) and (6) and assign edge 𝑒𝑖𝑗 to 𝐺𝑘 ;
(14)
if (𝜂𝑖𝑗 > 0) then 𝑃𝑎(𝑥𝑖 ) = 𝑃𝑎(𝑥𝑖 ) ∪ {𝑥𝑗 };
(15)
𝜂𝑖𝑗 = −∞;
(16)
for all 𝑥𝑎 ∈ Ancestors(𝑥𝑗 ) ∪ {𝑥𝑗 } and 𝑥𝑏 ∈ Descendants(𝑥𝑖 ) ∪ {𝑥𝑖 } do
𝜂𝑎𝑏 = −∞;
(17)
for 𝑘 = 1 to 𝑛 do
(18)
if (𝜂𝑖𝑘 > −∞) then 𝜂𝑖𝑗 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑃𝑎(𝑥𝑖 ) ∪ {𝑥𝑘 }) − 𝑓(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑃𝑎(𝑥𝑖 ));
(19)
end
(20)
𝜏𝑖𝑗 = (1 − 𝜌) ⋅ 𝜏𝑖𝑗 + 𝜌 ⋅ 𝜏0 ;
(21)
until ∀𝑖, 𝑗 (𝜂𝑖𝑗 ≤ 0 or 𝜂𝑖𝑗 = −∞);
(22)
end
(23)
𝐺𝑏 = arg max𝑘:1⋅⋅⋅𝑚 𝑓(𝐺𝑘 : 𝐷);
(24)
if 𝑓(𝐺𝑏 : 𝐷) ≥ 𝑓(𝐺∗ : 𝐷) then 𝐺∗ = 𝐺𝑏 ;
(25)
Update pheromone according to (3) using 𝑓(𝐺∗ : 𝐷);
(26)
𝑁iter + +;
(27) until 𝑁iter = 𝑁max ;
(28) return Bayesian network with structure 𝐺∗
Algorithm 1: The ACO-based algorithm for learning the BN structure.

(2) Customizing Privacy Requirement. A vulnerable node set
𝑉 ∈ 𝐸 and the sensitivity sen(V) for each V ∈ 𝑉 are specified
by the enterprise in this step. A vulnerable node set means
that a node set belongs to the enterprise profile and may lead
to privacy leakage risk to the enterprise. The sensitivity sen(V)
represents the severity of the business privacy leakage for the
enterprise due to disclosing V.
3.2. Risk Assessment Agent. This part involves risk assessment, and the risk threshold applied in profile filtration can
accompany the outcome of the agent.
Ant colony optimization (ACO) algorithm [31] is an algorithm that solves the problem by simulating the embodied
intelligent behavior of artificial ants groups in the process of
foraging. It is a method used to find the optimal path in graph.
ACO was originally used to solve TSP problem. After years of
development, it has gradually penetrated other areas.
With the risk assessment agent, a BN is developed to
represent the factors related to assessing the risk of business
privacy leakage. To indicate the relationships among privacy
risk factors, an algorithm (see Algorithm 1) based on ant
colony optimization (ACO) is generated to learn the BN
structure that best fits the environment of enterprise.

In each iteration, a network structure is built collaboratively by the ants on the basis of a candidate network. Each
ant picks an edge at random and then decides the state of that
edge based on the pheromones and heuristics in iteration.
More specifically, the performances consisting of two steps
of each ant are as follows.
(1) Random selection of the next edge: all edges of
the graph are candidates, and the next edge will be
evaluated from the set of candidates.
(2) Assignment of an edge state: this assignment is made
based on probability and searches for the balance
between the pheromone information and the locally
computed heuristic information.
The network is changed by the ant when it finds the
assignment with the highest score improvement, but the
premise is that the change does not lead to any cycle in
the network structure. If no higher scoring network can
be found, the pheromone information is updated with the
current network 𝐺 and the best network found so far, 𝐺∗ , to
lead the ants in the next iterations to higher quality networks.
When 𝑁iter = 𝑁max , that is, when the current number of
iterations is equal to the maximum number of iterations, the
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Risk ↓

Attack level
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Risk
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Figure 2: The filtration procedure.

process of iteration ends. 𝑁max should be set to a value high
enough to allow the pheromone matrix to become saturated.
The equations shown in Algorithm 1 are as follows.
(1) Heuristic Information. One has
𝜂𝑖𝑗 = 𝑓 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑃𝑎 (𝑥𝑖 ) ∪ {𝑥𝑗 }) − 𝑓 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑃𝑎 (𝑥𝑖 )) .

(2)

Table 2: The risk threshold.
Risk level
Very low
Low
Medium
High
Very high

Risk threshold (𝛽)
0.9
0.7
0.5
0.2
0.1

(2) Pheromone Updating Rule. One has
𝜏𝑖𝑗 ← (1 − 𝜌) 𝜏𝑖𝑗 + 𝜌Δ𝜏𝑖𝑗 ,

(3)

where
1
{ 

∗
Δ𝜏𝑖𝑗 = { 𝑓 (𝐺 : 𝐷)
{𝜏𝑖𝑗

if 𝑥𝑗 → 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝐺∗
if 𝑥𝑗 → 𝑥𝑖 ∉ 𝐺∗ ,

(4)

where 𝜏𝑖𝑗 is the level of pheromone in the arc 𝑥𝑗 → 𝑥𝑖 , 𝜌 (0 <
𝜌 ≤ 1) is a parameter controlling the pheromone, and 𝐺∗ is
the best graph found so far.
(3) Probabilistic Transition Rule. Select 𝑥𝑟 → 𝑥𝑙 such that
𝛼

𝛽

{arg max {[𝜏𝑖𝑗 ] [𝜂𝑖𝑗 ] }
𝑟, 𝑙 = { 𝑖,𝑗∈𝐹𝐺
{𝐼, 𝐽

if 𝑞 ≤ 𝑞0

(5)

if 𝑞 > 𝑞0 ,

where 𝐼, 𝐽 are two nodes chosen based on the following
equation:
𝛼

𝛽

[𝜏𝑖𝑗 ] [𝜂𝑖𝑗 ]
{
{
{
𝛼
𝛽
𝑝𝑘 (𝑖, 𝑗) = { ∑
[𝜏 ] [𝜂𝑢V ]
{
{ 𝑢,V∈𝐹𝐺 𝑢V
{0

if 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐹𝐺

(6)

otherwise.

In this agent, maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is
employed to calculate the parameters (conditional probability tables) of each node in the BN based on the expert’s
knowledge.
After the construction of the BN of privacy leakage risk,
the BN begins to act as a risk assessment tool and provides

updated information about each observable node in the BN
as inference evidence. The BN finally yields the occurrence
probability of the risk of privacy leakage.
To update previous estimates, the new evidence should
be plugged into the BN by probabilistic inference whenever
it is available in the process of the risk assessment. In BN,
probabilistic inference is a task that computes all posterior
marginals of nonevidence variables based on the given evidence. In this paper, an inference engine based on a junction
tree is introduced.
The result of privacy risk assessment is used to determine
the risk threshold, which is applied in the filtration agent. The
relationship between the risk threshold and the risk level is
shown in Table 2.
3.3. Filtration Agent. This agent filters the enterprise profile
𝐸 in an iterative manner based on the utility and privacy risk
metrics. The filtration agent is to work out all possible filtered
profiles for sensed data in a WSN to find the optimal filtration.
The specific procedure is as in Figure 2.
Based on the risk level estimated by risk assessment agent,
the enterprise faces different levels of the privacy leakage risk.
The risk may come from following four aspects.
Policy making is the first step of prevention and the
enterprise must implement a policy that specifies how to
manage the WSN firstly. An effective policy for WSN usage
should describe permissible usage, impermissible usage, and
behavioral regulations on WSN as well as access rights. In
addition, the penalties for violations of the policy, including security violations and system vandalism, should also
be covered. Before deploying WSN, enterprises should be
required to sign a policy declaration, avowing that they
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Table 3: Motivation of attacker.

Level
Weak
Intensive

Definition
Out of curiosity or having no obvious
motivation
Having a strong desire to attack to benefit from
valuable privacy

Cloud server
EEG sensor
ECG sensor
Oxygen sensor
EMG sensor
Motion sensor

Access point
Medical
center
PDA
Gateway

Table 4: Skill of attacker.
Level
Low
Medium
High

Definition
Collecting the public privacy on social
networks
Obtaining objective privacy by text-mining or
data analysis
Aggregating data and stealing privacy by
hacking into the database of social networks

Figure 3: System architecture of medical WSN.

establish the tradeoff to mitigate the risk and improve the
utility as much as possible. Then some sensitive keywords in
the profile are filtrated and the new profile is formed.

4. BPS Validation
understand that it will be kept on file as a legally binding
document.
Training is another proactive measure that can prevent
data misuse in the company. Enterprises can effectively convey and update policies to employees by means of training,
which is aimed at increasing awareness of the issues, reducing
occurrence of possible incidents, and decreasing corporate
liability. The components that the training focuses on are
topics such as defining accessible and inaccessible data,
identifying the warning signs of misuse in the workplace, and
identifying risk factors that may contribute to privacy leakage. Furthermore, comprehensive employee training should
cover how the company will address incidents of misuse.
The attack events are modeled with an exponential
probability distribution. A successful attack on the social
network is based on hackers’ motivations and skills and on
the vulnerability of the social network. As shown in Tables 3
and 4, the motivation range is (Weak, Intensive) and the skill
range is (Low, Medium, High), both of which are obtained
by expert evaluation based on the information from monitor
agent.
What is more, the profile sensitivity is an important factor
because different nodes have different privacy concerns. The
severity of the business privacy leakage for the enterprise
due to disclosure is various. Therefore, the sensitivity has a
certain impact on risk. Enterprise should control the profile’s
sensitivity.
When confronted with the utility of the profile, the
enterprise profile should be established firstly. The basic
information and data about enterprise are contained. It is
constructed as a tree and we can find the node in certain
layer. Then we can list the keywords for every profile. The
keywords help us find the current node in the tree. Based on
the profile, we can also determine the information content
and information importance. All these are about the utility
of the profile.
Based on the risk assessment agent, we can get a risk
threshold about the current situation. It is necessary to
control the risk level value lower than the risk threshold.
Under the premise of guaranteed risk threshold value, we

Recently, the application scope of wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) is wide. Many enterprises take advantage of WSN
technology to expand their business [31]. In this section, the
proposed BPS is applied to an Internet medical enterprise to
control its privacy leakage threat.
By placing sensor nodes in the human body surface or
in vivo, patients use the personal smart terminal equipment
(such as PDA, smartphones) to build up WSN through
self-organizing method. The network structure is shown in
Figure 3. The sensors distributed in various parts of the body
are used to detect physiological data (such as ECG, EEG,
Pulse IPI, and Blood pressure) or peripheral status information. This collected physiological data is sent to the personal
handheld devices via short-range wireless communication.
Then it will be transmitted to a remote database server
through the remote network. Remote medical personnel and
care officers analyze the local electronic medical data to detect
abnormal physiological condition of the patients and perform
remote feedback treatment.
The specific workflow of the application of WSN is
described as follows. By placing biological sensor nodes
in patient’s body, the system can detect physiological data
and surrounding circumstances. Then the collected data
is transmitted by wireless network to remote databases
and services. After the data processing, the patients and
doctors will receive the patient’s current physical condition
information on their personal smart terminal equipment
(such as smartphone) through wireless network. Remote
doctors analyze the received medical data and contact the
patients in abnormal physiological conditions, and then the
remote treatment and communication through the intelligent
terminal are formed.
The Internet medical enterprise must attach great importance to privacy protection in WSN, because the patients’
privacy disclosure will lead to very serious consequences.
For example, if a patient’s identification information, location
information, or physical conditions are intercepted by illegal
persons, it is a serious problem. Based on the patient’s
information, medicine marketing or some spam may be
caused. Of course, these will affect people’s normal life.
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Figure 4: Sample of Internet medical enterprise profile.
Table 5: Privacy of threat node in BN.
ID
R1

Threat node
Privacy leakage threat

State space
{High, Medium, Low}

Parent nodes
{RF 4, RF 5, RF 6}

Children nodes
Ø

Table 6: Privacy of threat factor nodes in BN.
ID
RF
RF
RF
RF
RF
RF

1
2
3
4
5
6

Threat factor
Skill of attackers
Vulnerabilities of the WSN
Motivation of attackers
Enterprise security measures
Threat of privacy leakage through WSN
Awareness of privacy security

State space
{High, Medium, Low}
{High, Medium, Low}
{Intensive, Weak}
{Effective, Average, Ineffective}
{High, Medium, Low}
{High, Medium, Low}

A sample of the enterprise profile is illustrated in Figure 4,
which is established according to the domain knowledge
about the enterprise.
As shown in Figure 4, there is some information about
patients in the enterprise, and here we just list a portion of
distinct information that sensors in WSN can accept. When
patients and doctors interact, they would generate incomplete
information. For example, a patient may use vague words
to describe his feelings, so that it will produce medium and
ambiguous keywords. These keywords may contain sensitive
information that patients do not want more people to know.
Thus, every node in the tree has its own sensitivity value that
represents the loss amount once privacy leakage happens.
4.1. Implementation. Based on the ACO-based algorithm
presented in Section 4.2, we develop the BN encapsulated
in the risk assessment agent. For the algorithm, different
parameter levels are examined, following the research presented in [32]. There are six different ant colony sizes, 𝑚 ∈
{5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50}; four different evaporation rate levels,
𝜌 ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75}; three different pheromone weighting
parameters, 𝛼 ∈ {0, 1, 5}; and three different desirability
parameters, 𝛽 ∈ {0, 1, 5}. The arbitrary positive constant 𝑄
is set to 100. The initial pheromone intensity on all arcs 𝜏0
is fixed at 1. Meanwhile, different numbers of iterations were
tested, and we found that the algorithm’s performance no
longer improved significantly after 500 iterations. Thus, the
maximum number of iterations was set to 𝑁max = 500. In
sum, our experiments show that 𝑚 = 30, 𝛼 = 1, 𝛽 = 5, and

Parent nodes
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
{RF 1, RF 2, RF 3}
{RF 4}

Children nodes
{RF 5}
{RF 5}
{RF 5}
{RF 6, R1}
{R1}
{R1}

Table 7: The risk level.
Risk level
Very low
Low
Medium
High
Very high

Risk state
Low
Low
Medium
High
High

Probability range
≥0.7
≥0.5
≥0.5
≥0.5
≥0.7

Table 8: The probabilities of threat occurrence.
Threat node
R1. Privacy
leakage threat

State

Probability

Risk level

High
Medium
Low

0.6152
0.2413
0.1435

High

𝜌 = 0.75 are the best choices for the parameter values for the
algorithm.
The details of the privacy leakage risk node that security
threat managers hope to predict ultimately are shown in
Table 5, whereas Table 6 presents the information regarding
the factor nodes of the risk node R1, that is, the causes that
lead to the privacy leakage. Figure 5 shows the BN structure
of privacy leakage risk and the conditional probability tables
of the nodes are shown in Appendix. Moreover, the IDs of the
BN nodes in Tables 9–11 and Figure 5 are explained in Tables
5 and 6.
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Table 9: CPT of 𝑃 (RF 5|RF 1, RF 2, and RF 3).

RF 1
High
Medium
Low
High
Medium
Low
High
Medium
Low
High
Medium
Low
High
Medium
Low
High
Medium
Low

RF 2
High
High
High
Medium
Medium
Medium
Low
Low
Low
High
High
High
Medium
Medium
Medium
Low
Low
Low

RF 3
Intensive
Intensive
Intensive
Intensive
Intensive
Intensive
Intensive
Intensive
Intensive
Weak
Weak
Weak
Weak
Weak
Weak
Weak
Weak
Weak

RF 5 = high
0.9727
0.7933
0.7169
0.7896
0.7016
0.5607
0.6195
0.5538
0.4939
0.7149
0.5950
0.5499
0.5674
0.3021
0.2201
0.4650
0.1929
0.0109

RF 5 = medium
0.0273
0.1978
0.2653
0.1601
0.2198
0.3401
0.2602
0.3394
0.3489
0.1962
0.2547
0.2789
0.3011
0.4125
0.3601
0.3004
0.3198
0.1688

RF 5 = low
0
0.0089
0.0178
0.0503
0.0786
0.0992
0.1203
0.1068
0.1572
0.0889
0.1503
0.1703
0.1315
0.2854
0.4198
0.2346
0.4873
0.8203

Table 10: CPT of 𝑃 (RF 6|RF 4).
RF 4
Effective
Average
Ineffective

RF 6 = high
0.0056
0.3028
0.8924

RF 6 = medium
0.1368
0.5786
0.1062

RF 6 = low
0.8576
0.1186
0.0014

The relationship between the risk level and the probability
of each risk state is shown in Table 7. We offer the updated
information about each observable node in the BN as inference evidence. With regard to the privacy leakage risk, the
estimated probabilities of risk state and risk level by security
threat assessment are shown in Table 8. Since the privacy
risk level is high, the risk threshold is set as 0.2 according to
Table 2.
4.2. Experiment Results. In this section, the experimental
results of BPS are presented. In this experiment, we analyze
and compare the results of utility and privacy risk in the
iterative process of the filtration.
Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate the results of the utility and
risk during the filtration, respectively. In order to show the
trend of the results clearly, we link the results on each iteration
with dotted line.
In Figure 6, the graph means that, with the number of
iterations increasing, the amounts of utility are gradually
decreased. We can observe that the utility displays an incremental decrease during filtration. This means that the higher
level topics improve the sensed information strength more
effectively. Figure 7 shows the results of the metric of risk
during the filtration. We observe that the privacy risk first
decreases incrementally, but the decline becomes slow as
more vulnerable node is pruned from the profile of sensed
data.

RF_3

RF_2

RF_1

RF_4

RF_6

RF_5

R1

Figure 5: BN structure of privacy leakage risk.

Figure 8 illustrates the tradeoff between the utility (i.e.,
IS) and the privacy risk. For the keywords issued to the WSN,
we can find that the utility increases incrementally with slight
compromise on risk, while, after a turning point, any small
utility will be improved at the cost of a great increase in
privacy risk. Therefore, the turning point is a near-optimal
solution for the tradeoff.

5. Conclusions
This paper proposes a business privacy-protection system
called BPS to mitigate the threat of enterprise’s privacy leakage in the application of wireless sensor networks (WSNs).
The main contributions are summarized as follows.
(1) In the BPS, we develop a filtration to filter sensitive
information from sensed data transmitted in a WSN
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Table 11: CPT of P (R 1|RF 4, RF 5, and RF 6).

RF 4
Effective
Average
Ineffective
Effective
Average
Ineffective
Effective
Average
Ineffective
Effective
Average
Ineffective
Effective
Average
Ineffective
Effective
Average
Ineffective
Effective
Average
Ineffective
Effective
Average
Ineffective
Effective
Average
Ineffective

RF 5
High
High
High
Medium
Medium
Medium
Low
Low
Low
High
High
High
Medium
Medium
Medium
Low
Low
Low
High
High
High
Medium
Medium
Medium
Low
Low
Low

RF 6
High
High
High
High
High
High
High
High
High
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low

R1 = high
0.4253
0.5435
0.6012
0.3186
0.3972
0.5048
0.0147
0.1738
0.4244
0.4987
0.5548
0.6943
0.4007
0.5142
0.7045
0.2918
0.4312
0.5413
0.6872
0.8325
0.9701
0.6303
0.7152
0.8047
0.5217
0.6045
0.7012

1

R1 = medium
0.2732
0.2432
0.2441
0.2816
0.2984
0.2699
0.1002
0.3017
0.2874
0.2671
0.2883
0.2089
0.3012
0.2844
0.1808
0.3067
0.2555
0.2498
0.1883
0.1186
0.0299
0.1972
0.1800
0.1628
0.2128
0.2413
0.2001

R1 = low
0.3015
0.2142
0.1547
0.3998
0.3044
0.2253
0.8851
0.5245
0.2882
0.2432
0.1569
0.0968
0.2981
0.2014
0.1147
0.4015
0.3133
0.2089
0.1245
0.0489
0
0.1725
0.1048
0.0325
0.2655
0.1542
0.0987

0.6
0.5

0.8

0.4
Risk

Utility

0.6
0.3

0.4
0.2
0.2

0

0.1

0

1

2
3
Number of iterations

4

5

Figure 6: Results of utility.

with respect to enterprise-specified privacy requirements.
(2) We formulate a tradeoff between two conflicting
metrics named utility and risk in the process of
profile filtration. The former one is defined as the

0

0

1

2
3
Number of iterations

4

5

Figure 7: Results of privacy risk.

information strength of the filtered profile of sensed
data, while the latter one represents the risk of the
profile exposure.
(3) We design three agents, profile agent, risk assessment
agent, and filtration agent, which are interrelated and

10

Journal of Sensors
1
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Figure 8: Utility versus risk.

interact with each other to implement the BPS based
on multiagent technology.
In future work, we will focus on the automatic retrieval
of the profile of sensed data based on the enterprise profile.
In addition, we also try to improve the current metrics to test
the performance of our proposed BPS.

Appendix
The conditional probability tables of the nodes (i.e., RF 5,
RF 6, and R1) in Figure 5 are shown in Tables 9–11.
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